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The Attorney Unshackled: SEC Rule 2(e) Violates
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Steven C Krane *
I. Introduction
Federal regulation of the economy has been the subject of sub-
stantial debate during the past several years. This debate has appar-
ently been resolved in favor of those who envision a strong economy
as one in which the government plays a smaller role.' An important
facet of fiscal recovery through conservative economics is an increase
in private capital investment, much of which will occur through the
medium of securities.2 Thus, the securities bar will find itself increas-
ingly active in the next several years.
It is therefore necessary for the bar to understand fully both its
responsibilities to the public and its obligations to its clients. Unfor-
tunately, the Rules of Practice of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC)3 provide little guidance to the securities bar.
The SEC enforces federal securities law by conducting investiga-
tions which may lead to criminal prosecutions, civil injunctions or
administrative proceedings to impose remedial sanctions. The SEC
is at once investigator, prosecutor, adjudicator and disciplinarian.
Although the SEC is primarily concerned with brokers and dealers in
securities, the agency has directed more of its recent efforts toward
regulating the conduct of the securities bar.
The principal tool of this regulation of attorneys has been rule
2(e) of the SEC Rules of Practice.4 Rule 2(e) provides in pertinent
* B.A., State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1978; J.D., New York University
School of Law, 1981. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professors Homer Kripke
and John J. Slain of the New York University School of Law for their support and guidance
in the preparation of this article.
I The election of Ronald Reagan would appear to indicate that the American people
favor such policies. See, e.g., Smith, Republican Gains Victories in All Areas and Vows to Act on
Economy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1980, at Al, col. 6; Tolchin, Republican Majority if Possible in
Senate, the First in 26 Years, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1980, at Al, col. 3.
2 See Final Report ofSEC Transition Team, reprinted in 587 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) K- 1,
at K-1 (1981) [hereinafter Transition Team Report]. See also Muzling the Watchdog, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 1981, at 72.
3 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.I-.28 (1981).
4 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1981). An attorney may also be subject to civil actions brought
by the SEC or private parties. Although case law is relatively underdeveloped, attorneys can
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part:
The Commission may deny, temporarily, or permanently, the privi-
lege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person
who is found by the Commission after notice of and opportunity for
hearing in the matter (i) not to possess the requisite qualifications
to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or
to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or
(iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the
violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws. . . , or the
rules and regulations thereunder.
5
The SEC has vigorously enforced this provision against attor-
neys and accountants, often in situations which lend little or no
assistance to those attempting to identify and circumscribe that con-
duct which is prohibited. Rule 2(e) discourages an attorney from
representing his client "zealously within the bounds of the law, which
be held liable for violations of federal securities laws. See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d
535 (2d Cir. 1973) (reversing denial of injunction against attorney for negligence in rendering
opinion); SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968) (liability for preparation of prospectus
with actual knowledge of misrepresentations); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (liability for failure to reasonably investigate truth of unexpertised por-
tions of registration statement). The most celebrated non-rule 2(e) attorney liability case is
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), where the court
refused to grant an injunction against the defendant lawyers.
Despite the availability of these other sanctions, the SEC has used rule 2(e) as its primary
disciplinary tool. This article will focus on this method of SEC enforcement. For other dis-
cussions of professional responsibility in the securities practice, see generally Daley & Karmel,
AtlorneA Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747 (1975);
Gruenbaum, Corporate/Securities Lawyers: Disrlosure, Responsibility, Liability to Investors, and Na-
tional Student Marketing Corp., 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 795 (1979) [hereinafter
Gruenbaum], Hazen, Corporate Mimanagement and the Federal Securities Actr Antifraud Provisions:
A Familiar Path With Some New Detours, 20 B.C.L. REv. 819 (1979); Johnson, The Dynamis of
Rule 2(e): A Crisisfor the Bar, 1975 UTAH L. REv. 629 [hereinafter Johnson]; Johnson, The
Expanaing Responsibilities of Attorneys in Pracice Before the SEC" Disciblinag, Proceedings Under Rule
2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 25 MERCER L. REV. 637 (1974); Karmel, Attornes'
Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAw. 1153 (1972); Kosek, Professional Responsibility ofAccount-
ants and Lawyers Before the Securities and Exchange Commission, 72 L. LIB. J. 453 (1979); Lipman,
The SECs Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (1974) [herein-
after Lipman]; Lome, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, The Public Interest, and Pofessional Eth-
ics, 76 MICH. L. REv. 423 (1978); Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities
Lauyers: An Anaysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM. L.
REv. 412 (1974) [hereinafter Lowenfels]; Marquis, An Appraisal of Attorneys' Responsibilities
Before Administrative Agencies, 26 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 285 (1976); Shipman, The Acedfor SEC
Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34
OHIO ST. L.J. 231 (1973); Sonde, Professional Responsibility-A New Religion, or the Old Gospel,
24 EMORY L.J. 827 (1975) [hereinafter Sonde]; Comment, SECDisciplinag Rules andthe Federal
Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DUKE L.J. 969;
Comment, Attorney Liability Under SEC Rule 2(e): A New Standard?, 11 TEx. TECH L. REv. 83
(1979) [hereinafter Texas Tech Comment].
5 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1981).
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includes . . .enforceable professional regulations."'6 Because of the
nebulous boundaries of the "professional regulation" enforced by the
SEC, an attorney may balk at advancing controversial claims, or at
using his best professional judgment and expertise for the benefit of
his client.
The argument that SEC disciplinary proceedings against attor-
neys violate the constitutional right to counsel of those being repre-
sented before the SEC has increased in popularity.7 Commentators
who have addressed the issue have failed to propound concrete legal
arguments to support their contentions, and instead either have as-
sumed that the sixth amendment guarantee of counsel" applies to
persons represented before the SEC 9 or have asserted basic policy
considerations' 0 for the extension of a constitutional right previously
guaranteed only to those accused of crimes."
This article proposes that the safeguards guaranteed criminal
defendants under the sixth amendment should be extended to those
persons involved in "quasi-criminal" proceedings or subject to "civil"
but nevertheless punitive sanctions. An attorney representing a cli-
ent in an SEC proceeding is intimidated by the mere existence of
potential liability under the nebulous rule 2(e); such intimidation at-
tenuates advocacy and thereby violates the client's constitutional
right to counsel.1 2 Moreover, because SEC proceedings are fre-
quently brought against attorneys who are not involved in SEC ad-
ministrative proceedings, but who are merely involved in the
6' ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, EC 7-1 (1980).
7 See, e.g., In re Keating Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release
No. 15,982 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting), reprintedin 17 SEC DOCKET 1149,
1162 (1979); Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAw. 987, 1010-11 (1980) [hereinafter
Marsh]; Freeman, Lawyer's Duty Should Be to Client, Not Government, Legal Times of Wash., Aug.
25, 1980, at 11-12 [hereinafter Freeman].
8 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment states in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense."
9 See In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No.
15,982 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting), reprinted in 17 SEC DOCKET 1149, 1162
(1979); Marsh, supra note 7, at 1010-11. See generally Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks at
Securities Regulation, 35 OHIO ST. LJ. 280 (1974) [hereinafter Freedman].
10 See Freeman, supra note 7, at 11-12.
11 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420
(1960); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). But see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144 (1963), discussed at text accompanying notes 122-32 infra.
12 The rather limited statutory right to counsel in administrative proceedings under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976), will be discussed in a later section of
the article. See text accompanying notes 89-95 infia.
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preparation of documents or in other so-called advisory capacities,
there is a substantial chilling effect on both the client's right to coun-
sel and the attorney's right to practice his chosen profession.'
3
II. The Essence of Rule 2(e)
A recent study of rule 2(e) concluded that there has been a dra-
matic increase in the number of rule 2(e) proceedings against attor-
neys over the past thirty years. ,4 Most of these were settled "without
any adjudication on the evidence of the respondent's guilt or inno-
cence."15 Thus, the escalated SEC offensive against lawyers has been
mostly met with unconditional surrender. A full understanding of
the way the SEC uses rule 2(e) requires an analysis of the scope of the
rule and an examination of its development.
A. The Scope of Rule 2(e): "Practice" Defined
The operative language of rule 2(e) states that the SEC "may
deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or
practicing before it in any way"' 6 to those who violate any of the
three enumerated standards. ' 7 By broadly defining "practicing," the
- SEC has brought the entire securities bar within its disciplinary pur-
view. Rule 2(g)' 8 states that:
[P]racticing before the Commission shall include, but shall not be
limited to (1) transacting any business with the Commission; and
(2) the preparation of any statement, opinion or other paper by
any attorney, accountant, engineer or other expert, filed with the
Commission in any registration statement, notification, application,
report or other document with the consent of such attorney, ac-
countant, engineer or other expert. '9
The definition of practice has been expanded by judicial inter-
pretation beyond representation of a client at SEC administrative
hearings and the preparation of documents and reports to be filed
with the SEC. Practice has been held to include the giving of any
13 See In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No.
15,982 (July 2, 1979) (Williams, Chairman, concurring), repuinted in 17 SEC DocKE-r 1149,
1165 (1979); Marsh, supra note 7, at 1011.
14 Marsh, supra note 7, at 988-89. The increase "appears to be an almost geometric pro-
gression." Id at 989.
15 Id at 989-90.
16 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1981).
17 Id See text accompanying note 5 supra.
18 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(g) (1981).
19 Id
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advice regarding the securities laws. 20 Moreover, the SEC has used
the language in rule 2(g), "but shall not be limited to," 21 to encom-
pass the preparation or dissemination of oral or written opinions, any
advice to an issuer of securities, and even the provision of "consulting
services to any other attorney regarding any security to be offered to
the public unless such other attorney states, in writing, that he alone
is responsible for the preparation of any oral or written opinions to be
disseminated regarding the public offering .... -22
By broadly defining practice and by maintaining an air of con-
fusion around the standards of rule 2(e), the SEC has forced securi-
ties attorneys to do little else besides practice securities law. The
expertise and compulsive due diligence required by the SEC virtually
ensures a high degree of specialization in the securities bar. While
this may result in the administration of the federal securities laws by
proficient and experienced lawyers, the SEC has also justified vigor-
ous assertion of rule 2(e) with the argument that the rule merely de-
prives an attorney of a small portion of his legal practice.
23
The SEC stated that "a suspension from practice before this
Commission would not be as serious as a court-ordered suspension
which would completely bar the attorney from engaging in any form
of law practice during the period of the suspension. ' '24 The SEC thus
forces attorneys to devote substantially all their energies to the securi-
ties field, and at the same time asserts that should a lawyer be de-
prived of his "privilege" 25 to practice before the SEC, he can still
earn a living through the nonexistent remainder of his practice-a
20 See SEC v. Ezrine, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,594
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), quoted in Daley & Karmel, supra note 4, at 764. For a discussion of rule 2(g)
as it relates to accountants, see Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Miuse of Rule 2(e), 54
NOTRE DAME LAw. 774, 775-76 (1979) [hereinafter Downing & Miller].
21 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(g) (1981).
22 In re Richard D. Hodgin, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 16,225 (Sept.
27, 1979), reprinted in 18 SEC DOCKET 458,459-60 (1979). See also Marsh,supra note 7, at 993-
95.
23 See Gonson, Outline of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Enforcement and
Disciplinary Initiatives with Respect to Attorneys, N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Disciplinary Sympo-
sium, May 2, 1980, at 2-3 & n.2 [hereinafter Gonson].
24 In re Murray A. Kivitz, Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971), reprinted in
[1970-71 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,144, at 80,479, reo'don other grounds,
475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also In re Emanuel Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404
(June 18, 1973), reprinted in 2 SEC DOCKET 1, 4-5 n.20 (1973): "The disciplinary sanctions
that we impose on lawyers can affect only their capacity to engage in our rather narrow type
of practice."
25 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1981). But see Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973):
"[W]e have always viewed an attorney's license to practice as a 'right' which can not lightly or
capriciously be taken from him." Id at 962.
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small comfort, indeed.26
B. The Development of Rule 2(e)
1. Emanuel Fields and Footnote 20
Rule 2(e) developed as a principal part of the SEC regulatory
structure with In re Emanuel Fields.2 7 Although this opinion is fre-
quently cited in rule 2(e) proceedings,' the conduct of Fields was
rather egregious. Fields had been the subject of four permanent in-
junctions restraining him from violating the registration and an-
tifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, and was charged
"with having schemed to defraud as well as with violations of the
Securities Act's registration requirements. '28  Fields' entire defense
consisted "solely of a legal attack on [the SEC's] power to discipline
him or indeed to discipline any attorney who practices before" the
SEC.2 9 The SEC held that it had the power to disbar, based on sev-
eral court decisions. 30 In a footnote3l the SEC asserted that a rule
2(e) order is not as severe a sanction as total disbarment. 32 But foot-
note 20 is often cited33 for its discussion of the role of an attorney in
26 An SEC Solicitor notes that "a bar to practice before the Commission can be a very
substantial sanction to a specialist in securities laws." Gonson, supra note 23, at 2 n.2.
27 Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), reprinted in 2 SEC DOCKEr 1 (1973).
28 2 SEC Docket, at 2.
29 Id
30 I; see Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 122 (1926); Herman v.
Dulles, 205 F.2d 715, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701, 704 (D.D.C.
1957), afd on other grounds, 252 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958).
31 Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), reprinted in 2 SEC DOCKEr, at 4-5
n.20 (1973).
32 See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra. Footnote 20 of the Fields decision states in
part:
An order of this Commission that suspends or terminates an attorney's ability to
practice is a serious-a very serious-matter for us and for him. Nothing that we
say here should be construed as minimizing the gravity ofsuch a step. Yet we think
it well to note that the impact ofan order by us under our Rule 2(e) is not nearly so
devastating as is that of the order of a court barring a man from practicing law at
all. The disciplinary sanctions that we impose on lawyers can affect only their ca-
pacity to engage in our rather narrow type of practice. A lawyer barred from ap-
pearing before us is still free to hold himself out to the world as a lawyer, to practice
before all tribunals save this one, and to counsel clients with respect to the infinite
variety of legal problems that do not impinge on the area affected by the federal
securities statutes.
2 SEC DOCKET, at 4 n.20.
33 See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 579 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Carter &
Johnson, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 17,597 (Feb. 28, 1981), reprnted in 593
SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) N-i, at N-3 n.21 (1981); In re Carter &Johnson, Initial Decision
(Mar. 7, 1979), reprinted in 494 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) F-i, at F-15 (1979); In re Keating,
Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 15,982 (July 2, 1979),
[Vol. 57:501
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the securities practice:
[One must not overlook] the peculiarly strategic and especially cen-
tral place of the private practicing lawyer in the investment process
and in the enforcement of the body of federal law aimed at keeping.
that process fair. Members of this Commission have pointed out
time and time again that the task of enforcing the securities laws
rests in overwhelming measure on the bar's shoulders. These were
statements of what all who are versed in the practicabilities of se-
curities law know to be a truism, i.e., that this Commission with its
small staff, limited resources, and onerous tasks is peculiarly depen-
dent on the probity and the diligence of the professionals who prac-
tice before it.
3 4
Despite the uncertain legitimacy of this claim, 35 the SEC pro-
ceeded in footnote 20 to elaborate upon the nature of the work of a
securities attorney and the duty he owes to the investing public:
Very little of a securities lawyer's work is adversary in character.
He doesn't work in courtrooms where the pressure of vigilant adver-
saries and alert judges checks him. He works in his office where he
prepares prospectuses, proxy statements, opinions of counsel, and
other documents that we, our staff, the financial community, and
the investing public must take on faith. This is a field where un-
scrupulous lawyers can inflict irreparable harm on those who rely
on the disclosure documents that they produce. Hence we are
under a duty to hold our bar to appropriate rigorous standards of
professional honor.
36
The SEC, however, does not take the documents "on faith."
The extensive review of disclosure documents by the SEC staff pro-
vides a strong element of adversarial pressure upon the securities law-
yer, as does the threat of disciplinary sanctions imposed by bar
associations and judicial committees.
3 7
reprinted in 17 SEC DOCKET 1149, 1165 (1979) (Williams, Chairman, concurring);
Gruenbaum,supra note 4, at 802 n.33; Kosek, Professional Responsibitlit ofAccountants andLawyers
Before the Securities and Exchange Commision, 72 L. LiB. J. 453, 463 (1979); Johnson, supra note 4,
at 640; Lipman, supra note 4, at 450 n.70; Lowenfels, supra note 4, at 424; Shipman, The Need
for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Statutes,
34 OHio ST. L.J. 231, 296 (1973); Sonde, supra note 4, at 861-62. Many of these authorities
neglect to mention in citing the Fields language that it is derived from a footnote.
34 2 SEC DOCKET, at 4-5 n.20. But see Lipman, supra note 4, at 475: "[Tlhe superior
financial resources of the SEC, and, in some cases, the superior abilities of its lawyers, often
result in an unequal presentation of the merits of each side of an issue." (footnotes omitted).
35 See text accompanying notes 230-32 in/fa.
36 2 SEC DOCKET, at 5 n.20.
37 See Lipman, supra note 4, at 450 n.70. But see Lowenfels, sura note 4, at 423-24.
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2. Rule 2(e) Matures: Touche Ross and Keating, Muething &
Klekamp
In 1979, three opinions were rendered, at different levels of the
SEC disciplinary process, which caused increased concern on the
part of all professionals. In March, an administrative law judge is-
sued the initial decision In re Carter &Johnson .38 In June, the Second
Circuit decided Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC.3 9 Finally, in July, the SEC
issued its opinion in In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp.
4°
In Touche Ross, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the power of the SEC to discipline accountants
under rule 2(e)4 t despite the lack of express congressional authoriza-
tion for such action.42 The court based its decision upon its percep-
tion of the legitimacy of the SEC's power to "protect the integrity of
its own processes. '43 The court also noted the "mere fact" that the
rule is of long standing and that "no court has ever held that the rule
is invalid." 44 In dicta, the court drew upon the Emanuel Fields opin-
ion, paraphrasing yet qualifying the noted footnote 20:
The role of the accounting and legal professions in implementing
the objectives of the disclosure policy has increased in importance
as the number and complexity of securities transactions has in-
creased. By the very nature of its operations, the Commission, with
its small staff and limited resources, cannot possibly examine, with
the degree of close scrutiny required for full disclosure, each of the
many financial statements which are filed. Recognizing this, the
Commission necessarily must rely heavily on both the accounting
and legal professions to perform their tasks diligently and respon-
sibly. Breaches of professional responsibility jeopardize the
achievement of the objectives of the securities laws and can inflict
great damage on public investors.
45
38 Initial Decision (Mar. 7, 1979), reprintedin 494 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) F-I (1979).
See text accompanying notes 60-68 infra.
39 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
40 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 15,982 (July 2, 1979), reprinted in 17 SEC
DOCKET 1149 (1979).
41 609 F.2d at 582. In fact, that was the only issue before the court, because the appeal
arose from Touche Ross' action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the SEC to enjoin
the rule 2(e) proceeding that had been commenced against it. Id at 572-74.
42 Id at 577-78. See generally Comment, Regulation of the Accounting Profession Through Rule
2(e) of the SECs Rules of Practice: ValidorlnvalidExercise ofPower?, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1159
(1980).
43 609 F.2d at 581. The court also noted that there was no express statutory prohibition
against such power. Id
44 Id at 578. The court recognized, however, that a rule is not valid merely because it is
"long standing." Id
45 Id at 580-81.
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Thus, while the court accepted the SEC's complaint of "small staff
and limited resources," it rejected the assertion that the SEC must
take documents for filing "on faith." The argument of the court is
persuasive-the SEC cannot thoroughly inspect every document and
must rely to a great extent on the integrity of the bar. But that reli-
ance does not counterbalance the deprivation of the regulated cli-
ent's constitutional right to counsel. Despite its arguable infirmities,
the Touche Ross case is "the only declarative statement of SEC au-
thority to promulgate rule 2(e), and according to the court, rule 2(e)
is a valid exercise of the SEC's authority.
'46
Shortly after Touche Ross, the SEC issued In re Keating, Muething
&Klekamp (KMK).47 KMK consented to an order imposing reme-
dial sanctions pursuant to rule 2(e) for having failed to include cer-
tain material information in documents filed with the SEC.
48
Moreover, the SEC held an entire law firm accountable for the ac-
tions of only a few partners, because the firm did not have adequate
internal procedures to ensure "that disclosure documents filed with
the Commission include all material facts about a client of which it
has knowledge as a result of its legal representation of the client. ' 49
The KMK firm, however, was unusual in that the majority of its
work was done for one particular corporate client, 50 and several of
the KMK partners were interested parties and directors of this cli-
ent.51 While a court might take notice of the peculiar facts of KMK
in applying the ruling to future rule 2(e) proceedings, the SEC is not
likely to do so.
52
Commissioner Karmel's dissent in KMK is the best exposition of
the opposition to rule 2(e). Commissioner Karmel had mounted sim-
ilar attacks against other SEC enforcement sanctions prior to
KMK.93 A good summary of the argument was made by the Coin-
46 Texas Tech Comment, sulpra note 4, at 104.
47 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 15,982 (July 2, 1979), repn'znedin 17 SEC
DOCKET 1147 (1979).
48 Id at 1155-56.
49 Id at 1156 (footnote omitted).
50 See id "[A]Imost every member of KMK was involved in some aspect of [the client's]
representation. Indeed, KMK derived a large part of its fees, at times ranging from 50 to 80
percent of its billings, from representation of [the client] and its subsidiaries." Id
51 See id at 1150.
52 But see id at 1166 (Williams, Chairman, concurring): "Given all the relevant facts and
circumstances of this case, where virtually the entire firm was acting in a capacity more akin
to house counsel, than outside counsel, the firm is properly the subject of this proceeding."
53 See, e.g., In re Spartek Inc., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 15,567 (Feb.
14, 1979) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting), reprinted in 16 SEC DOCKET 1094, 1101 (1979); Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 15,664 (Mar. 21, 1979) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissent-
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missioner herself:
As a general policy matter, I believe that it is repugnant to our
adversary system of legal representation to permit a prosecutorial
agency to discipline attorneys who act as counsel to regulated per-
sons. The frequently made distinction between the lawyer as an
adversary and the lawyer as an advisor cannot and should not be
made by an agency with significant prosecutorial responsibilities.
5 4
Commissioner Karmel continued to propound this viewpoint until
her resignation from the SEC in 1980.
55
Chairman Williams concurred specifically to refute the allega-
tions in Commissioner Karmel's dissent. 56 Chairman Williams' view
is that despite the "potential for misuse or abuse inherent in an
agency which has been given both enforcement and regulatory pow-
ers," the SEC should not "ignore or refuse to exercise an effective
disciplinary tool under the appropriate circumstances.
'57
With KMK, rule 2(e) and the surrounding controversy had be-
come the cause celebre of the securities field.58 But at the same time a
case, which might have clarified many of the cloudy issues regarding
rule 2(e), was pending before the SEC. This case was In re Carter &
Johnson 59
3. Carter &Johnson: All in All, Not Worth the Wait
Perhaps William R. Carter (Carter) and Charles J. Johnson, Jr.
(Johnson) were the only two people for whom the decision in In re
Carter &Johnson was worth the nearly two year wait from the date of
the Initial Decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).60 The
ALJ found that Carter and Johnson had engaged in "unethical" and
ing), reprinted in [1978-79 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,014, at 81,558. See
also Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAw. 173, 196-98 (1981).
54 17 SEC DOCKET, at 1157.
55 See, e.g., In re Plotkin, Yolles, Siegel & Turner, Securities Act Release No. 6105 (Aug.
15, 1979) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting), reprinted in 18 SEC DOCKET 64, 65 (1979); In re
Richard D. Hodgin, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 16,225 (Sept. 27, 1979)
(Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting), reprinted in 18 SEC DOCKET 458, 460 (1979); In re Bernard J.
Coven, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 16,448 (Dec. 21, 1979) (Karmel,
Comm'r, dissenting), reprinted in 19 SEC DOCKET 12, 13 (1979); In re Darrell L. Nielson,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 16,479 (Jan. 10, 1980) (Karmel, Comm'r, dis-
senting), reprinted in [1979-80] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,446.
56 17 SEC DOCKEr, at 1163.
57 Id at 1165.
58 See Marsh, supra note 7, at 987.
59 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 17,597 (Feb. 28, 1981), reprinted in 593
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) N-1 (1981).
60 See note 40 sura; In re Carter & Johnson, Initial Decision (Mar. 7, 1979), reprinted in
494 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) F-I (1979).
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"improper" professional conduct 6 despite their allegation that the
terms are unconstitutionally vague. 62 In its decision, the SEC recog-
nized that:
[t]he ethical and professional responsibilities of lawyers who
become aware that their client is engaging in violations of the se-
curities laws have not been so firmly and unambiguously estab-
lished that we believe all practicing lawyers can be held to an
awareness of generally recognized norms.
63
Without stating that the conduct of Carter and Johnson was in fact
professional and ethical, 64 the SEC proceeded to "hereby giv[e] no-
tice of its interpretation of 'unethical or improper professional con-
duct' as that term is used in rule 2(e)(1)(ii). 6 5
The case involved the collapse of the National Telephone Com-
pany (National), which leased telephone equipment systems to com-
mercial customers under long-term leases. National required a
substantial initial cash outlay to finance the equipment and its mar-
keting and installation before lease payments began. Accordingly,
National was forced to. seek outside financing to provide working
capital until lease payments began. National obtained financing
with conditions designed to prevent overexpansion of operations.
These funds were insufficient, and National filed for bankruptcy in
1975.66
During this period, National was represented by Carter and
Johnson. National issued a misleading press release that concealed
its precarious cash position, and filed overstated earnings and
revenue figures with the SEC. Despite Carter and Johnson's re-
peated warnings that the company was violating the securities laws,
National's chairman issued the questionable information. 67 The case
against Carter and Johnson centered around their obligation to go
beyond attempted persuasion of a corporate officer when that officer
refused to heed advice of counsel.
The ALJ found that Carter and Johnson's failure to go to the
61 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(ii) (1981).
62 494 SEC. REG. & L. REP. at F-11. The SEC is currently seeking comments on its
definition of "unethical or improper professional conduct," see text accompanying note 70
inf a. See Ranii, ABA Opposes Securities Lawyers' Code, Nat'l LJ., Dec. 7, 1981, at 5.
63 593 SEc. REG. & L. REP. at N-17.
64 The new standards set forth by the SEC were not valid retroactively; Carter and John-
son were held not to have violated the standards merely because the standards did not exist at
the time of their conduct. Id at N-19.
65 Id at N-17.
66 See id at N-4 to -5.
67 See id at N-6 to -13.
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National board of directors was in itself a breach of professional re-
sponsibility.68 The ALJ stated:
The matter of counsel responsibility when confronted with irregu-
lar or illegal client activity involves a delicate balance between
judgment and courage. Counsel needs to guard against falling prey
to blandishments of client [sic] by accepting repeated evasion and
rationalization, or worse, to allow himself to be drawn into or be-
come a party to the illegal activity. Decision concerning the point
at which further persuasion in the face of client defiance becomes
futile cannot be postponed indefinitely. To drift may be as culpa-
ble as to connive. At some point it becomes necessary to take a
stand.
69
Unfortunately, the ALJ did not define either the "some point" or
what "stand" was required to be taken. That, in essence, was the
purpose of the Carter &Johnson decision, and the SEC did indeed
attempt to clarify the nebulous rule 2(e) standard.
Even in the narrow Carter &Johnson context, the SEC's delinea-
tion of professional responsibility deserves particular attention. The
SEC stated:
When a lawyer with signiftant responsibilities in the effectuation of a
company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the fed-
eral securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a
substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure require-
ments, his continued participation violates professional standards
unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance. 70
There are three steps to the SEC's analysis of noncompliance
problems, and each is subject to variable interpretations. First,
which attorneys have "significant responsibilities" in a client's com-
pliance program? Presumably, the senior partner in charge of the
client's affairs would fall within this definition. Perhaps a junior
partner or senior associate to whom was delegated responsibility for
"effectuation of a company's compliance with the disclosure require-
ments of the federal securities laws" would also fall within the rubric
of "significant responsibilities." But what of the junior associate who
is given responsibility for the preparation of the more mechanical
and repetitive documents to be filed with the SEC? How significant
must the responsibilities be before an attorney will be subject to lia-
bility for failure to take "prompt steps" to remedy the situation?
The SEC has given significantly more guidance in defining the
68 494 SEc. REG. & L. REP. at F-3.
69 Id at F-15.
70 593 Sec. REG. & L. REP. at N-19 (emphasis added).
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other two variables in the Carter &Johnson test. A "substantial and
continuing failure" to satisfy disclosure requirements is not "isolated
disclosure action or inaction" on the part of the client. 71 However,
"there may be isolated disclosure failures that are so serious that their
correction becomes a matter of primary professional concern. ' 72 Al-
though the SEC has merely substituted one variable, "so serious," for
another, "substantial and continuing," attorneys can at least be sure
that they must take "prompt steps" after more than one occurrence
of inaccurate disclosure. Nevertheless, the SEC has left itself room
for imaginative applications of rule 2(e).
The critical question of the Carter &Johnson test is what consti-
tutes the taking of "prompt steps" to end a client's noncompliance.
The SEC states that while "counselling accurate disclosure" may be
sufficient for awhile, "there comes a point at which a reasonable law-
yer must conclude that his advice is not being followed, or even
sought in good faith, and that his client is involved in a continuing
course of violating the securities laws."'73 At that point, the SEC re-
quires that an attorney "take further, more affirmative steps" to clear
himself of an inference of cooption into the client's scheme. What
steps will satisfy this obligation is not clear, although the SEC sug-
gests that an attorney might resign, but not prematurely, 74 or that he
might approach the board of directors or other management person-
nel to enlist their aid.75 These are merely suggested courses of action
for an attorney; the ultimate standard is barely more lucid than was
"unethical or improper professional conduct:"
What is required, in short, is some prompt action, [though not neces-
sarily successful] that leads to the conclusion that the lawyer is en-
gaged in efforts to correct the underlying problem, rather than
having capitulated to the desires of a strong-willed, but misguided
client. . . . So long as a lawyer is acting in goodfaith and exerting
reasonable eforts to prevent violations of the law by his client, his
professional obligations have been met.
76




74 Id Indeed, premature resignation would help neither the enforcement of the securities
laws nor the attorney's practice.
75 Id
76 Id (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The substance of the omitted footnote is in-
cluded in brackets within the text of the quotation.
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whether an attorney is suspended or disbarred, will of course be
made by the SEC.
In sum, an attorney after Carter &Johnson knows that if his client
commits more than one, or perhaps only one, act of inaccurate dis-
closure, the attorney must do "something." Whether that something
is sufficient to exonerate the attorney will be determined in proceed-
ings under rule 2(e). Attorneys are still unable to determine whether
their conduct will subject them to suspension or disbarment. And
when a severe sanction with nebulous standards is placed in the
hands of an agency with investigative, prosecutorial and adjudica-
tory powers, the client's right to be represented in the regulatory pro-
cess by unintimidated counsel is violated.
III. Applicability of the Sixth Amendment to Practice
Before the SEC
It is the intention of this article to present the legal community
with a constitutional argument against rule 2(e). This article will
show that due to the quasi-criminal or punitive nature of the SEC's
regulatory structure, clients being represented before the SEC are en-
titled to the effective assistance of counsel. Rule 2(e) eviscerates that
right by its intimidation of counsel and its chilling effect 77 on the
entire attorney-client relationship.
A. Right to Counsel in an Administrative Context: Present
Status of the Law
The sixth amendment guarantees all criminal defendants the
right to the assistance of counsel on their behalf.78 Mere representa-
tion, however, has been held not to satisfy this constitutional guaran-
tee; the defendant also has a right to effective counsel. 79 Before this
77 The phrase "chilling effect" is used in this article to draw an analogy to the cases
which invalidate overbroad restrictions on constitutional freedoms. The concept has tradi-
tionally been confined, however, to first amendment rights. See Law Students Civil Rights
Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1971); accord, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972); Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971);
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907). See also
SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1970); Marketlines, Inc. v. SEC,
384 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1967).
78 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. See note 8 supra. This right obligates the state to provide
counsel to indigent criminal defendants. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
79 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). The Court stated that "if the right
to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to
the mercies of incompetent counsel, and. . . judges should strive to maintain proper stan-
1.
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right to counsel was articulated, the Supreme Court, in Hannah v.
Larche,80 had ruled that there is no due process guarantee in the con-
text of hearings before the Civil Rights Commission, a purely
nonadjudicatory body.81 The Court noted that "the Commission
does not and cannot take any affirmative action which will affect an
individual's legal rights. The only purpose of its existence is to find
facts which may subsequently be used as the basis for legislative or
executive action. ' S2 In contrast, the Court also stated that "when
governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations
which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative
that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been
associated with the judicial process.
'83
The Hannah decision held that due process safeguards are
neither necessary nor appropriate in proceedings before a nonadjudi-
catory body. Subsequent decisions, however, have established a bi-
furcated test for the application of constitutional rights before
administrative agencies. When an agency acts to "adjudicate or
make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of
individuals," due process safeguards apply. When the agency acts in
a nonadjudicatory manner, the constitutional rights are inapplica-'
ble.84 What this dichotomy fails to perceive is that the Hannah Court
looked to the nature of the agency proceeding to determine whether
constitutional protections applied.
85
The majority opinion in Hannah prompted an impassioned dis-
dards of performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in their
courts." Id at 771.
80 363 U.S. 420 (1960). See Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287, 291-92 (1959);
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 332-33 (1957).
81 363 U.S. at 441. The case involved the rules of procedure in fact-finding hearings
before the Commission on Civil Rights. The rules gave neither a right to receive notice of
specific charges, nor a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Id at 442-45.
82 Id at 441.
83 Id at 442. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), in which the Court stated:
"We think that adjudication within a federal administrative agency shares enough of the
characteristics of the judicial process that those who participate in such adjudication should
also be immune from suits for damages." Id at 512-13. Moreover, the Court found "that the
role of the modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge. . . is 'functionally
comparable' to that of a judge." Id at 513.
84 See FCC v. Schreiber, 329 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1964), modifldon other grounds, 381 U.S.
279 (1965). See also SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Great Lakes Screw Corp. v.
NLRB, 409 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1969); SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1966).
85 The Hannah Court specifically distinguished the SEC from the Civil Rights Commis-
sion because the SEC was an adjudicatory body which could use information from investiga-
tions in administrative and injunctive proceedings. 363 U.S. at 461-63.
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sent by Justice Douglas.8 6 Justice Douglas viewed administrative
proceedings as threats to the judicial process:
Farming out pieces of trials to investigative agencies is fragmentiz-
ing the kind of trial the Constitution authorizes. It prejudices the
ultimate trial itself, and puts in the hands of officials the awesome
power which the Framers entrusted only to judges, grand jurors
and petit jurors drawn from the community where the accused
lives. It leads to government by inquisition.
87
Indeed, the modern concept of a "quasi-judicial agency proceeding"
arose out of the Hannah opinion.88 But the right to counsel in such
proceedings was subsequently limited to the statutory right granted
under section 6 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 89
Under the APA, "a person compelled to appear before an
agency or representative thereof is entitled to be accompanied, repre-
sented, and advised by counsel or, if permitted by the agency, by
other qualified representative. '"90 Courts have held that because ad-
ministrative orders are "not criminal judgments," persons appearing
before administrative agencies are not entitled to appointed counsel
and, accordingly, the government is not obligated to provide such
counsel. 91 Most courts, however, acknowledge the affected person's
right to employ counsel if he so chooses.92 The APA right to counsel
86 Id at 493 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas's opinion was joined by Justice
Black. Id
87 Id at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
88 Although the "quasi-judicial" concept may be traced back to Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938), it was not used extensively until the post-Hannah era. In Morgan, the
Court stated:
The vast expansion of this field of administrative regulation in response to the pres-
sure of social needs is made possible under our system by adherence to the basic
principles that the legislature shall appropriately determine the standards of ad-
ministrative action and that in administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial char-
acter the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.
Id at 14-15. See also Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926), in which the
Court held that because of "the quasi-judicial nature of its duties," id at 121, the Board could
discipline attorneys and other professionals practicing before it. It is difficult to understand
how an agency may be quasi-judicial for purposes of disciplining attorneys and not quasi-
judicial for purposes of administrative proceedings.
89 Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1976). See FCC v. Schreiber, 329 F.2d
517, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1964), modijfd on othergrounds, 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
90 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976). See Daley & Karmel, supra note 4, at 796-804.
91 See Boruski v. SEC, 340 F.2d 991,992 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 381 U.S. 943 (1965); accord,
Feeney v. SEC, 564 F.2d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978); Nees v.
SEC, 414 F.2d 211, 221 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 338 (E.D.
Pa. 1978); Grover v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 337, 347 (1973).
92 See, e.g., Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211, 221 (9th Cir. 1969); Great Lakes Screw Corp. v.
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cannot be limited in the absence of a formally adopted regulation. 93
Courts are reluctant to allow an agency's regulations to override the
statutory right to counsel, especially if the rule "bears directly and
prejudicially upon the interests of the person himself. '94 An agency,
however, is not "obligated to assure. . . 'reasonabl[y] competent and
effective representation' within the meaning of criminal cases
"95
Neither the APA right to counsel nor the application of constitu-
tional due process safeguards to administrative proceedings is ade-
quate to support a challenge to the constitutionality of rule 2(e).96
The present right to counsel merely allows a person to select his own
attorney in an adjudicative administrative proceeding. It can be ar-
gued, however, that the sixth amendment right to counsel applies to
all administrative proceedings and regulatory matters, indeed, to a
securities practice as broad as that delineated in rule 2(g). 97 The next
section of this article will discuss theories under which such an argu-
ment can be made.
B. Extending the Scope of Constitutional Safeguards Beyond Criminal
Prosecutions: 4 Merger of Two Theories
1. Quasi-Criminal Proceedings
The concept of the quasi-criminal proceeding was derived from
Boydv. United States.98 Boyd involved an attempted subpoena of busi-
ness records for use in a forfeiture proceeding. The Court stated that
forfeiture proceedings, "though they may be civil in form, are in their
nature criminal," that is "of [a] quasi-criminal nature." 99 The Court
held that the fourth and fifth amendment guarantees were applica-
ble to such proceedings, reasoning that the search and seizure of
books to bring about a forfeiture was essentially the same as forcing a
NLRB, 409 F.2d 375, 380-81 (7th Cir. 1969); Grover v. United States, 200 Ct. CI. 337, 347
(1973).
93 See Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1960).
94 SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1966). See a/so SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7,
11 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Great Lakes Screw Corp. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 375, 380-81 (7th Cir. 1969).
95 Sartain v. SEC, 601 F.2d 1366, 1375 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586
F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979)).
96 See generally Comment, The Applicabiliy ofthe Sixth or Seventh Amendment Right to aJu.y
Trial in OSHA Penalty Proceedings, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 108 (1976); Note, O.S.HA. 's Civil Penal-
ties-Should Thy Be AJorded Sixth Amendment Protection?, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 722 (1976).
97 17 C.F.R. § 2 01.2(g) (1981). See text accompanying notes 16-26 supra.
98 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
99 Id at 633-34.
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person to testify against himself at a trial. 100
The quasi-criminal concept was reaffirmed in One 1958 Pymouth
Sedan v. Pennylvania.t '0 The case involved the improper search and
seizure of an automobile and its contents, bootlegged liquor. Writing
for the Court, Justice Goldberg reiterated the Boyd dictum, 0 2 and
continued:
It would be anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to hold
that in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized evidence is ex-
cludable, while in the forfeiture proceeding, requiring the determi-
nation that the criminal law has been violated, the same evidence
would be admissible. That the forfeiture is clearly a penalty for the
criminal offense and can result in even greater punishment than the
criminal prosecution has in fact been recognized by the Penn-
sylvania courts. 103
A number of lower court opinions utilized the quasi-criminal
concept in fourth amendment challenges to governmental searches
and seizures.' °4 The Supreme Court, however, subsequently re-
stricted the scope of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. In
United States v. Calandra,10 5 the Court held that "standing to invoke
the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations where the gov-
100 Id at 630. The Court thus extended the fourth and fifth amendment zone of privacy.
Id at 630. This zone of privacy concept was recently limited by the Supreme Court. See
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). See
generaly Note, The Lift and Times ofBoyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REv. 184
(1977).
It can be persuasively argued that the holding of Boyd reduces the "quasi-criminal" lan-
guage to mere dictum. See Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for
Constitutional Analysir, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 414-20 (1976) [hereinafter Clark]. Thus, the
quasi-criminal doctrine is actually dictum transformed by subsequent misinterpretation.
101 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
102 "[A] forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like a criminal
proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law." Id at 700.
103 Id at 701.
104 See Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969)
(holding invalid a tax assessment based on illegally seized evidence); Knoll Assoc. v. FTC, 397
F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (fourth amendment applicable in FTC proceeding). See also Olin-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F.
Supp. 391, 407-08 (S.D. Iowa 1968); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Lassoffv. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843, 846-49 (W.D. Ky. 1962). In Olmstead, Justice Bran-
deis stated:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.
277 U.S. at 485 (dissenting opinion).
105 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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ernment seeks to inaiminate the victim of an unlawful search." 0 6 The
Court in United States v. Janis 10 7 stated that "in the complex and tur-
bulent history of the exclusionary rule, the Court has never applied it
to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state., 0 8 The
decision did not rest upon the civil nature of the proceeding, how-
ever, but upon the "intrasovereign" nature of the constitutional vio-
lation. The deterrent purpose of the rule would not be furthered by
suppressing evidence illegally seized by a "sovereign" different from
the one seeking to use it. 09
Although theJanis Court did not rely on the civil nature of the
proceeding, some lower courts have interpreted the decision to mean
that the exclusionary rule is applicable only in criminal prosecu-
tions."10 Other courts have simply retreated to applying the quasi-
criminal doctrine only in forfeiture cases."' The few cases which
have addressed the propriety of using the quasi-criminal doctrine in
administrative proceedings have ruled against its application."
t 2
Although it may not have much vitality, a mutated form of the
quasi-criminal doctrine may be of assistance to the argument pro-
posed by this article. A trend has developed among courts and schol-
ars to look not to the proceeding involved but to the nature of the
law sought to be applied for a determination of quasi-criminal sta-
tus. t" 3 Most notably, the Supreme Court in United States v. Ward" 4
held that the imposition of a penalty under the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act was not a quasi-criminal proceeding because of the
106 Id at 348 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
107 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
108 Id at 447.
109 Id at 456 & n.32. Evidence illegally seized by a state criminal law enforcement agent
was sought to be excluded from use in a federal tax evasion action.
110 Compare Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 794-95 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (pre-Janir
decision in which a college disciplinary proceeding was held quasi-criminal; marijuana ille-
gally seized from a student dormitory room was excluded from the proceeding) with Morale
v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 1000-01 (D.N.H. 1976) (post-Jamn decision in which college disci-
plinary proceeding was held not to be a criminal prosecution; marijuana illegally seized from
student dormitory room was not excluded from the proceeding). But see Savina Home Indus.
v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1362 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1979).
111 See United States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 328 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Huber,
603 F.2d 387, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1979).
112 See Savina Home Indus. v Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1366-67 (10th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360, 362 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915
(1970).
113 See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1980); Savina Home Indus. v.
Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d at 1362 n.6; Clark, supra note 100, at 381.
114 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
[October 19811
RIGHT TO COUNSEL VIOLATION
non-punitive nature of the law itself.' 5 Using the punitive nature of
the sanction, as opposed to the proceeding, as the criterion for the
application of safeguards usually reserved for criminal defendants"1
6
is the key to the success of the argument that SEC rule 2(e) deprives
clients of their constitutional right to counsel.
2. Punitive Sanctions: Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
Although the sixth amendment specifically applies only to crim-
inal proceedings, there has been a growing trend toward the expan-
sion of the amendment's protections to encompass more than what
are traditionally viewed as criminal prosecutions. This trend reached
the Supreme Court in the late 1950s in Trop v. Dulles 1 7 and Greene v.
McElroy."18 Both of these cases involved the extension of due process
safeguards based upon the punitive nature of the sanction imposed in
the proceeding, regardless of whether the proceeding had been la-
beled "criminal." The Court in Trop stated:
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this court has generally
based its determination upon the purpose of the statute. If the stat-
ute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment-that is, to
reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.-it has been consid-
ered penal. But a statute has been considered nonpenal if it im-
poses a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other
legitimate governmental purpose. 1 9
The Greene court agreed that the purpose of the statute determines its
nature, and that due process safeguards must apply to administrative
proceedings.1
20
115 I at 253.
116 See Clark, supra note 100, at 381, wherein the author defined the term "quasi-
criminal":
Laws that provide for punishment but are civil rather than criminal in form have
sometimes been labeled "quasi-criminal" by the Supreme Court. These laws,
broadly speaking, provide for civil money penalties, forfeitures of property, and the
punitive imposition of various disabilities, such as the loss of professional license or
public employment.
Id (footnotes omitted). Indeed, the court in Savina Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 594
F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979), was prompted by Professor Clark's definition to note that
"[u]nder this definition an argument could be made that [administrative] civil penalties con-
stitute quasi-criminal sanctions." Id at 1362 n.6.
117 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
118 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
119 356 U.S. at 96 (footnotes omitted).
120 See 360 U.S. at 507-8. See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 505 (1960) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
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a. Development of a Two- Tiered Test
The major problem facing courts is deciding whether the "civil"
penalty is, in effect, a punitive sanction. 12 1 Not until Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez122 did the Supreme Court squarely confront the ques-
tion. The Court set forth a two-tiered test which has become the
standard by which courts determine whether a sanction is puni-
tive.' 23 Mendoza-Martinez involved the statutory divestiture of U.S.
citizenship from a person who left the United States to evade the
draft during World War II.124 For the first tier, the Court looked to
the legislative history of the statute. Noting that there is an "impera-
tive necessity for safeguarding these rights to procedural due process
[even] under the gravest of emergencies,"' 125 the Court held that
"Congress has plainly employed the sanction of deprivation of na-
tionality as a punishment. . . without affording the procedural safe-
guards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments."'
1 26
Accordingly, the sanction could not be imposed without all the inci-
dents of a criminal trial, "including . . . assistance of counsel
"127
Having based its conclusion on "objective manifestations of con-
gressional purpose,"' 128 that is, upon congressional debates and re-
ports, 129 the Court did not reach the second tier of its proposed
analysis. The Court did, however, delineate this second tier, which
consists of seven factors to be considered in relation to the statute of
its face," in the absence of "conclusive evidence of congressional in-
tent as to the penal nature of a statute. ... 13 Divined from case
law, these seven factors are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether
it comes into play only on a finding of sczenter, whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
121 See Hart, The Aims of the Cn'minal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 431 (1958).
122 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
123 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the vitality of the Mendoza-Martiez tests in
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
124 372 U.S. at 146-52.
125 Id at 165.
126 Id at 165-66.
127 Id at 167.
128 Id at 169.
129 See id at 170-84.
130 Id at 169.
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connected is assignable to it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned .... 131
These factors are "certainly neither exhaustive, nor dispositive...
but provide some guidance" to courts in deciding whether a given
statute is punitive.1
3 2
b. Scholarly Modifiation of the Punitive Intent Doctrine
The reasons for applying criminal protections to civil-labeled
sanctions have been variously stated. One commentator argued that
civil administrative penalties are "susceptible to arbitrary applica-
tion" and are "tantamount to administrative blackmail. ' 133 Another
theorized that because "some non-criminal sanctions are as grave as
some criminal sanctions,. . . consistency ought to require that pro-
tection be afforded whenever a person is threatened with a grave
sanction." 134 A third asserted that the possibility for abuse is greater
in an administrative context where a broad range of imaginative but
"civil" penalties may be devised by "ingenious minds when freed
from the confines of judicial convention."' 135 Recently, however,
other scholars have set forth theories which add to the list of factors
and enhance the utility of the legislative history to be considered by a
court in analyzing punitive sanctions.
The new factors look primarily to the nature of the punishment
imposed, as do several of the Mendoza-Martinez factors. These involve,
however,,the "infamy" or "stigma"' 36 associated with the imposition
of the penalty, and the non-compensatory, retributive, and deterrent
nature of the sanction.137 The infamous punishment concept was de-
veloped in the late nineteenth century in Wong Wing v. United
States,13 8,in which imprisonment at hard labor for violations of immi-
gration laws, while not labeled "criminal," was held to be "infa-
131 Id at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
132 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251 (1980).
133 Murphy, Money Penalties-An Administrative Sword of Damocles, 2 SANTA CLARA LAW.
113, 134 (1962).
134 Comment, The Concept of Pmitive Legislation and the Sixth Amendment: A New Look at
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 290, 292 (1965).
135 McKay, Sanctions in Motion, The Administrative Process, 49 IOWA L. REv. 441, 446-49
(1964).
136 See Clark, supra note 100, at 401-03, 406-10.
137 Chaney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 478, 497-500 (1974) [hereinafter Charney].
138 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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mous" and therefore punitive in nature. 39  If the infamous
punishment doctrine lends any support to the article's argument, it
does so to prove that the "civil" label should be lightly regarded
when evaluating statutes for punitive elements.
40
Professor Henry Hart noted that "[W]hat distinguishes a crimi-
nal from a civil sanction. . . is the judgment of community condem-
nation which accompanies and justifies its imposition."'1'4 While not
infamous, then, a penalty may stigmatize its target perhaps more
than would a minor yet "criminal" offense. One commentator put
forth the example of a "large civil penalty imposed for intentional
failure to comply with anti-pollution laws" in contrast with "a small
fine labeled 'criminal' imposed for a traffic offense."' 42 Indeed, such
a view is far more reasonable with regard to corporate defendants
that cannot themselves be physically imprisoned, pilloried, whipped
or subjected to other "infamous" punishments.
In United States v. Ward,143 however, the Supreme Court found a
civil penalty provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act not
to be punitive.144 In making its determination, the Court simply
looked to the civil label of the statute. 45 Such a perfunctory analysis
is hardly consistent with the law of punitive sanctions. Perhaps,
then, this decision may be explained by the nature of the sanction
involved. Ward challenged a provision which was designed to rem-
edy oil spills by requiring prompt notification to the U.S. Govern-
ment of any such occurrences. 46 The funds collected as fines for
violations of the provision were to be used to finance the administra-
tion of the Act and were in that sense, "remedial."'
' 47
A remedial purpose is inconsistent with the criminal law. 48 Ac-
139 One commentator explains Mendoza-Martintz as an extension of this infamous punish-
ment doctrine. See Clark, supra note 110, at 401-02.
140 See Charney, supra note 137, at 513-14.
141 Hart, The Ahms ofthe Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 404 (1958). See also
Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne, Inc., 24 A.D. 2d 615, 262 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1965) (mem.):
"The term 'penalty' involves the idea of punishment, and its character is not changed by the
mode in which it is inflicted, whether by civil action or a criminal prosecution." Id at 615,
262 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
142 Clark, sura note 100, at 408.
143 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
144 Id at 251.
145 Id at 250-5 1. The Court paid cursory attention to the Mendoza-AMarlnez factors, but
gave them little weight in the decision. Id at 250.
146 Id at 247.
147 Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'dsub nom. United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
148 See H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 23-26 (1968).
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tions authorized to compensate for damages or loss are not criminal;
suits brought to punish defendants are criminal. 149 A relevant de-
lineation of the compensation-punishment distinction was made by
LaFave and Scott:
Criminal law and the law of torts (more than any other form of
civil law) are related branches of the law; yet in a sense they are two
quite different matters. The aim of the criminal law. . . is toprotect
thepublic against harm, by punishing harmful results of conduct or at
least situations (not yet resulting in actual harm) which are likely to
result in harm if allowed to proceed further. . . . With crimes, the
state itself brings criminal proceedings to protect the public interest
but not to compensate the victim .... 150
This is an ideal summary of Congress' intent in enacting the
federal securities laws-to protect the public from harm and to pre-
vent future violations. The next section of this article will examine
the legislative history of the securities laws pursuant to the first tier of
the Mendoza-Martinez test, as modified by the compensation-punish-
ment distinction. Because that legislative history is dispositive of the
punitive nature of the securities laws, evaluation of the securities laws
with respect to the seven factors stated in the second tier of the Men-
doza-Martinez test is unnecessary.
C. The Punitive Nature of SEC Sanctions
At the time of the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933
Act) 15 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)152 the
prevailing mood in Congress was retributive-to punish those people
thought to be responsible for the Great Depression. Congressman
Rayburn, a sponsor of the 1933 Act, stated in the House:
These hired officials of our great corporations who permitted, who
promoted, who achieved the extravagant expansion of the financial
structure of their respective companies today present a pitiable
spectacle. Five years ago they arrogated to themselves the greatest
privileges. They scorned the interference of the Government. They
dealt with their stockholders in the most arbitrary fashion. They
called upon the people to bow down to them as the real rulers of
the country. Safe from the pitiless publicity of Government super-
vision, unrestrained by Federal statute, free from any formal con-
trol, these few men, proud and arrogant, and blind, drove the
149 See Charney, sufira note 137, at 497.
150 W. LAFAV E & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3, at 11 (1972) (emphasis added). See also
Charney, supra note 137, at 497-500.
151 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1976).
152 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
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country to financial ruin. Some of them are fugitives from justice
in foreign lands; some of them have committed suicide; some of
them are under indictment; some of them are in prison; all of them
are in terror of the consequences of their own deeds.1
53
These sentiments were not unique. Other members of Congress
spoke of the "crooks" from whom the public was to be protected,
54
the "shrewd and crafty men, skilled in the tricks of a crooked game,
[who] sit around a table and deliberately and premeditatedly plan,
by devising cunning schemes and resorting to every conceivable trick
of financial legerdemain, to loot an unwary public of millions of dol-
lars earned by the sweat of the brow."'
15 5
The stated purpose of the 1933 Act is to "provide full and fair
disclosure,"15 6 to protect the public from fraud. The civil and crimi-
nal penalties incorporated into the Act serve the dual purposes of
(1) ensuring compliance to protect the public against harm, and
(2) deterring future violations which would likely result in harm.
These purposes are precisely those which LaFave and Scott identified
as the elements which distinguish a criminal law from a civil law.
157
That such were the purposes of Congress in enacting the 1933 Act is
evident from an examination of the congressional debates.
Early in the House debate, Congressman Rayburn stated:
Let me repeat that what we seek to attain by this enactment is to
make available to the prospective purchaser, if he is wise enough to
use it, all information that is pertinent that would put him on no-
tice and on guard, and then let him beware. On the other hand, we
demand of the seller that he give full and fair information with
153 77 CONG. REc. 2918 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Rayburn).
154 Id at 2935 (remarks of Rep. Chapman).
155 Id See id at 2928 (remarks of Rep. Kelly): "Two forces oppose the necessary action.
Those who desire destruction and overthrow wish us to drift on ruin. There are also stupidly
selfish interests who will permit destruction rather than surrender what they regard as the
right to reap profit from the helplessness of others;" id at 2938 (remarks of Rep. Beck):
From what I have seen of corporate business in this country, I believe that if we had
prosecuting attorneys and judges who would speed the trial of criminal cases, and
as a result, if there were more of this class of predatory millionaires in jail and less
[sic] of them in palatial homes on Fifth Avenue, we would not have any necessity
for this legislation. [Applause.]
Id at 2944 (remarks of Rep. Gibson):
Our country has been under attack from two classes of enemies, the criminal who
breaks the law for private gain and the man who, under the cover of the law, has by
false representation taken the savings of his less fortunate fellow men. These two
classes may be comprehended by that modern term "racketeers." They have, to use
a common expression, "bled the country white."
156 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 18 Stat. 74 (preamble).
157 See text accompanying note 150 supra.
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reference to the security offered, under penalty of both civil and
criminal liability if he evades or conceals material facts. If the seller
is a wise man he will also beware.' 58
Congressman Wolverton echoed these sentiments, stating that "to in-
sure care and remove possibility [sic] of untrue or extravagant state-
ments of fact, civil as well as criminal responsibility is fixed upon the
issuer, every officer, director, or agent who permits his name to be
used in connection therewith."'' 5 9 It appears evident that the "civil"
penalties were intended to punish violators and to deter future viola-
tions, all in the interest of protecting the public from harm. The
penalties are therefore criminal. 6°
A similar conclusion may be reached with respect to the congres-
sional intent in enacting the 1934 Act, which was also aimed at elimi-
nating certain abuses of the stock exchanges. One Congressman
summed up the feeling behind the bill:
I hold no brief for those who would deliberately interfere with or
hamper legitimate business. On the other hand, I insist that since
the stock market has in the past been guilty of practices that tran-
scend the legitimate, they, as well as all other offenders, should be
brought within the law that calls for an honest, fair, and open
chance for the citizen who desires to invest his money in legitimate
securities. If in doing so he loses through the natural or ordinary
hazard in industry and commerce, that is a loss he is willing to take.
But if he is sheared like a lamb through a rigged market, through
manipulations, resulting from wash sales and matched orders, he
has a legitimate cause for complaint, and it is his Government's
business, through its legislative and executive branches, to throw
about this stock-purchasing and stock-selling business such safe-
guards as will make these tricky devices, so long indulged in, impos-
sible in the future.'
6 '
Some spoke of protecting the public, 162 others of punishing those evil
158 77 CONG. REc. 2919 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Rayburn).
159 Id at 2931 (remarks of Rep. Wolverton). See also id at 2932 (remarks of Rep. Mar-
land): "[The Act's] provisions will protect innocent purchasers from the designs of fraudulent
stock and bond promoters;... it will, in fact, cause the seller to beware of the penalties for its
violation, and relieve the purchaser somewhat of the old rule of caveat emptor, 'Let the buyer
beware.'"
160 See also id at 2952-54. The above cited comments have been derived exclusively from
the debates in the House of Representatives. This is because the Senate debate on its version
of the Act was greatly attenuated. The House bill, H.R. 5480, was ultimately adopted with
little change by the Senate. Accordingly, the Senate debates are inconsequential to an analy-
sis of congressional intent. See generally id at 2983.
161 78 CONG. RE . 7717 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Ford). See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934), reprintedin 78 CONG. Rac. 7701, 7702-03 (1934).
162 78 CONG. Rc. 7690 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Cooper).
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men who had done foul deeds, "leaving a slimy trail of legalized bur-
glary, rotten riggings of markets, and feculent odors of grand larceny
that led from coast to coast and Gulf to Lakes, and smelled to high
heaven."1 63
Much of the dispute over the 1934 Act concerned the proposed
establishment of the SEC to administer the federal securities laws. In
particular, the sweeping regulatory authority of the proposed SEC
caused some concern: "It is doubtful whether ever in the history of
Congress such a wide and sweeping delegation of power has been
given to any administrative body to create by rule and regulation
crimes punishable by severe fine and imprisonment, or both."
164
Most of the debate involved the propriety of vesting in an adminis-
trative agency the power to inflict severe sanctions upon violators of
statutes, rules and regulations.
The overwhelming congressional intent in enacting the 1933
and 1934 Acts was punitive. The sanctions were designed to .punish
violators and to deter future violations, all to protect the public from
harm.165 Moreover, securities sanctions are stigmatic because they
can severely damage the business or personal reputations of their
targets. 166 Assuming, arguendo, that there exists a securities law or
regulation purely civil in nature, that is purely compensatory and not
retributive or deterrent, such a law would not dissolve the punitive
taint which runs through the entire regulatory scheme. Indeed, the
basis of this article's argument is that the securities laws as a whole
are punitive-they seek to protect the unwary investor from harm
through the punishment and deterrence of once and future offenders.
Corporations, broker-dealers, and other entities operate under a pan-
oply of laws and regulations, and cannot anticipate whether the SEC
will subject them to penalties labeled civil or criminal, or whether
severe or light sanctions will be imposed. 67 Surely such entities are
entitled to constitutional safeguards when criminal charges are
pressed; because the civil penalties of the securities laws were in-
163 Id at 7941 (remarks of Rep. Truax).
164 Id at 8112 (remarks of Rep. Cooper). See generaly id at 8112-13 (remarks of Rep.
Cooper). See also id at 8273 (colloquy of Senator Black and Senator Steiwer).
165 See generally Transition Team Report, supra note 2, at K-2.
166 See generally Lacy, Adverse Publicity and SEC Enforcement Procedure, 46 FORDHAM L. REV.
435 (1977).
167 See Bennett, For the Defense.- Opposing the Government in Securities Cases, 3 J. CONTEMP. L.
2, 10 (1976); Gellhorn, Administrative Aresciption andImposition of Penalties, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q.
265, 276.
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tended to be punitive, their targets are also entitled to constitutional
protection.
The denial of counsel which rule 2(e) perpetrates cannot be con-
fined to all provisions except those which are purely "civil." Because
of the overriding responsibility of an attorney to represent his client
thoroughly, the denial of the right to counsel for purposes of even one
phase of practice before the SEC operates to consume and eviscerate
the constitutional right to counsel and the attorney-client relation-
ship. The overwhelmingly punitive nature of the securities laws
points to the conclusion that an entity being represented in any
phase of the securities practice, as defined in SEC rule 2(g), 168 is enti-
tled to the assistance of counsel, a right guaranteed by the sixth
amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
169
IV. The Unshackling: Rule 2(e) Violates the Sixth Amendment
This article has shown that the sixth amendment guarantee of
counsel should apply to entities dealing with the SEC. In this sec-
tion, the nature of that constitutional right will be examined in the
context of the two major roles of an attorney in the securities prac-
tice-advocate and advisor. As a practical matter, however, it is first
necessary to resolve one of the threshold questions of constitutional
litigation: whether the party raising the claim has standing to sue.
Certainly, there is standing if the client claims a deprivation of its
right to counsel; the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III
of the Constitution is thereby satisfied. 70
An attorney subject to a rule 2(e) proceeding may also claim
that the rule is invalid because his client is deprived of sixth amend-
ment rights. The attorney is not asserting his own right, however,
but is in the posture of a third party. Physicians have been allowed
to assert their constitutional rights to practice their chosen profession,
a right established by the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska,71 in
the context of cases involving abortion laws. 72 Courts which have
168 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(g) (1981).
169 Because the legislative history of the securities laws is dispositive as to the question of
punitive intent, this article will not reach the second tier proposed in Mendoza-Marinez. Note,
however, that a discussion of most of the seven factors is subsumed in the above analysis.
170 U.S. CONsT. art. III; see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 42-50 (3d ed.
1976).
171 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);'
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
172 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th
Cir.), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 891 (1974); Larkin v. Bruce, 352 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Wis. 1972),
appeal dismissed, 483 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1973).
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addressed the issue have found the right of attorneys "to challenge
any act which interferes with his professional obligations to his client
and thereby, through the lawyer, invades the client's constitutional
right to counsel," to be an even stronger case for the grant of third
party standing. 73 Consequently, the constitutional claim may be
raised by either the attorney or the client.
A. Undue Interference with the Attorney-Client Relationship: The Lawyer
as Advocate
The attorney's obligation to his client has long been the subject
of debate. At one extreme is the celebrated view of Henry Lord
Brougham, who stated in 1819:
An advocate in the discharge of his duty knows but one person in
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expediants [sic], and at all hazards and costs to other
persons, among them to himself, is his first and only duty; and in
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments,
the destruction he may bring upon others.
1 74
At the other extreme is the view that the lawyer should be independ-
ent of his client, and should act as would an auditor. 75 A more mod-
erate approach, a reasonable compromise, has been reached and
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Al-
though currently undergoing revision, the CPR represents a reasoned
and fair approach to the problem of professional conduct. The CPR,
while containing some vague terms, is sufficiently detailed to address
specific situations which a lawyer may face. In rule 2(e), however,
the SEC has distilled the CPR and an entire body of case law from
fifty states into the simple phrase, "unethical or improper profes-
sional conduct."' 176 This might be acceptable if rule 2(e) and the
173 Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir.
1974). See also Keker v. Procunier, 398 F. Supp. 756, 760-61 (E.D. Cal. 1975). But see Silver v.
Queen's Hosp., 518 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1975) (mem.) (dictum), quoted in Keker v. Procunier,
398 F. Supp. at 760-61 n.3. The Keker court stated:
This court can perceive no reason why. . . the attorneys. . . should not . . . be
permitted to raise the question of violation of Sixth Amendment rights. The mir-
ror-image of the client's Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel is the attor-
ney's right to practice his profession without undue governmental interference.
The vindication of one is consequently dependent upon the vindication of the
other.
398 F. Supp. at 765.
174 G. SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE PRO-
FESSION OF THE LAW 29 (1854) (quoting Henry Lord Brougham).
175 See text accompanying notes 210-20 infra.
176 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(ii) (1981).
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CPR were coextensive; the SEC, however, had disclosed its view that
such is not the case.
177
Any impermissible interference in the attorney-client relation-
ship violates the client's right to counsel. Many courts have wrestled
with the question whether particular conduct constitutes a constitu-
tional violation, and the vast majority has determined that govern-
mental intimidation of counsel is impermissible. In fact, any undue
interference with the attorney's representation of his client violates
the sixth amendment. Rule 2(e) is such an intrusion.
1. The Intimidating SEC
a. The Judicial Defition of "Intimidation"
The right to counsel "may not be fettered by harassment of gov-
ernment officials," stated the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Committee v. Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation.'78 That case, however, involved allegedly
improper arrests of and physical assaults on committee members by
government agents.179 While Wounded Knee is an extreme case, its
principle is clear-such harassment will not be tolerated under the
Constitution. Similarly, it is clear that when the government actu-
ally intrudes upon the attorney-client relationship, through elec-
tronic surveillance devices, undercover agents "planted" in the
defense camp, or the like, a strong claim exists that the sixth amend-
ment has been violated.
1 80
Rule 2(e) however, is neither physical abuse nor physical intru-
sion. It violates the sixth amendment by psychologically attenuating
the scope of conduct of an attorney, keeping him out of the grey
expanse between egregiousness and triviality. 8 Even when there is
177 See text accompanying notes 60-76 sufra.
178 507 F.2d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1974).
179 Id at 1283 & n.3.
180 See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d
1182 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 929 (1977); United States v. Choate, 527 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 971 (1976). The Court in Weatherford declined to rule that an actual intrusion into the
attorney-client relation is afperse violation of the right to counsel, because in that case there
was no tainted evidence, no communication of defense strategy, and no purposeful intrusion.
See 429 U.S. at 557-58. The implication of Weatherford, however, is that an intentional intru-
sion would violate the sixth amendment. See generally Comment, Constitutional Law--Sirth
Amendment-Right to Counsel-Confdentialil of Attore-Client Consultation, 16 Duo. L. REv. 269
(1977-78). Justice Marshall dissented in Weatherford, arguing that any intrusion is a violation
of the sixth amendment. See 429 U.S. at 564-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
181 See generalt Lipman, supra note 4, at 453.
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no physical intrusion, there may still be a constitutional violation. As
Judge Frankel stated in In re Terke/toub,182 a civil case:
The ultimate interest to be protected is the privacy and confidenti-
ality of the lawyer's work in preparing the case. It is the violation
of that interest that is held offensive to the Constitution in the case
of eavesdropping and spying. The protection would be a thin illu-
sion if the Government could hav6 for the asking what it has, in
rare lapses, sought by less genteel means.183
Minor irregularities in governmental conduct, however, have
been held not to violate the sixth amendment. For example, there
was no violation when a trial judge instructed the attorney to elicit
evidence in a chronological fashion. 184 A prosecutor's isolated ques-
tion implying misconduct on the part of defense counsel was also
held not to violate the client's right to counsel.18 5 Nor was a state-
ment by government attorneys that defense counsel would be called
as a prosecution witness violative of the sixth amendment.18 6
However, a trial judge's refusal to allow an attorney to make a
closing argument was found violative in both a jury trial 87 and a
non-jury proceeding.'88 Deprivation of the effective assistance of
counsel was found when the
court had demeaned counsel and. . . such counsel was afraid to be
a vigorous advocate for fear of the judge's reaction. After the court
had told counsel three times that counsel needed a lawyer for him-
self, had questioned counsel's competence, and had stated that the
court would have counsel investigated by Disciplinary Committee
of the Bar Association, counsel [unsuccessfully] moved for trial
before a different judge in the district. 189
The court in Bursten v. United States 190 summarized the thrust of these
cases, stating when counsel is so unnerved that he cannot "devote his
182 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The case involved an application to compel an
attorney to give testimony before a grand jury. Id.
183 Id at 685.
184 United States v. Moton, 493 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1974).
185 United States ex rel Perry v. Mulligan, 544 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 972 (1977); United States v. Rangel, 488 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 984
(1974).
186 Lyons v. United States, 325 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 969 (1964).
187 Patty v. Bordenkircher, 603 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1979).
188 Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
189 United States v. Davis, 442 F.2d 72, 74 (10th Cir. 1971). Cf Cooper v. United States,
403 F.2d 71, 73 (10th Cir. 1968) (judge's conduct characterized as "no more than displays
indicative of a firm control of the proceedings falling well within the reasonable bounds
within which a trial judge may act").
190 395 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972).
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best talents to the defense of his client, then this is ground for rever-
sal, no matter what counsel's experience and equipoise may be."'' 9
b. The Intimidating Efect of Rule 2(e)
Rule 2(e) is indeed an unnerving force exerted on attorneys by
the SEC. Many commentators have noted the rule's effect on the
legal profession. "An attorney cannot adequately represent his cli-
ents when he is worried about his own liability."' 92 "No lawyer is
going to be able to give independent advice if he's going to be watch-
ing out for his own skin."' 9 3 Because of the combination of increas-
ing attorney liability and the more aggressive assertion of rule 2(e),
it may be questionable that many attorneys will still be willing to
zealously represent a client ... if the client's position is not clearly
and undoubtedly in compliance with any and all views of the secur-
ities laws, rather than just arguably so, even though the securities
laws are still unclear and nebulous in many areas and are subject to
varying interpretations.194
The SEC has, moreover, been known to actualy intimidate attor-
neys, by threats of prosecution under rule 2(e) or otherwise.
95
Monroe Freedman discussed the system of "rewards" and "punish-
ments" used by the SEC to control attorney conduct:
The rewards consist of favored treatment to some lawyers in their
appearances before the Commission . ..That . . . represents a
conscious effort to encourage lawyers to trade off the rights of some
clients in order to curry favor with the Commission and thereby
advance the rights of other clients. . . . The punishments are di-
rected toward intimidating attorneys into foregoing zealous advo-
cacy on behalf of their clients. One attorney, engaged in vigorous
defense of his client's rights, was advised by a staff member that he
should "take a look at the National Student Marketing complaint,"
in which attorneys were named as respondents.
96
There is no way to determine how frequently such instances of
actual intimidation occur. 97 Assuming, however, that the majority
191 395 F.2d at 983.
192 Daley & Karmel, supra note 4, at 825.
193 P. HOFFMAN, LIoNs IN THE STREET 171 (1973).
194 Johnson, The Expanding Respnsbi/ities of Attornes in Practice Before the SC. Disciplinag
Proceedings Under Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 25 MERCER L. REV. 637, 660
(1974). Accord, Lipman,,supra note 4, at 474.
195 See Freedman, supra note 9, at 283-84. See also Comment, SEC Diciplinaqi Rules andthe
Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DuKE L.J.
969, 1010; Freedman, supra note 9, at 285.
196 Freedman, supra note 9, at 285.
197 SEC Solicitor Paul Gonson states: "[Tihe Commission has never, or virtually never,
[Vol. 57:50]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
of SEC attorneys are rational, fair-minded individuals 98 who would
not even consider threatening attorneys with prosecution for zealous
advocacy, the potential for such threats still remains.199 The vesting
of broad disciplinary power in a multi-functioned administrative
agency is compounded by the vagueness of the standards of conduct
set out in rule 2(e).
2. The Vagueness of Rule 2(e)
The SEC has consistently avoided the creation of discernable
boundaries for attorney conduct acceptable under rule 2(e). This
vagueness leads to suppression of attorney conduct to a level per-
ceived as "safe," that is, unlikely to subject the lawyer to a proceed-
ing under rule 2(e). A thorough examination of the rule 2(e)
standards is virtually impossible, as there are no identifiable stan-
dards embodied in the rule;200 this article will nevertheless attempt to
discern what conduct is prohibited by the SEC.
Rule 2(e)(1)(i) provides for the suspension or disbarment of any
person found "not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent
others .... ',201 There is no indication of the nature of the qualifica-
tions which the SEC deems "requisite." The phrase may mean that
one who is not qualified to practice law, in the generic sense, may not
practice before the SEC. The phrase may also be designed to require
specific competence in the securities field. If the generic interpreta-
tion is proper, then rule 2(e) is redundant because it would coincide
with the CPR and the state bar rules. However, if rule 2(e)(1)(i)
requires some undefined degree of specialization, the SEC's argu-
ment that the rule is innocuous compared to complete disbarment is
not valid.
202
Rule 2(e) (1) (ii) contains two phrases of equal indefinability. An
attorney may be suspended or disbarred if he is found "to be lacking
in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper
brought a Rule 2(e) proceeding against a lawyer who appeared as an advocate for a client
under investigation or accused of past wrongdoing. . . It is almost impossible to point to an
actual case that appears to have resulted from vindictiveness." Gonson, supra note 23, at 22
n.28.
198 See H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH
OF A PURPOSE 2-3 (1979).
199 It should be also noted that SEC attorneys have immunity from civil liability for their
actions. See Carlsberg v. Gatzek, 442 F. Supp. 813 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
200 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 657; Marsh, supra note 7, at 995-98.
201 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(i) (1981).
202 See text accompanying notes 16-26 supra.
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professional conduct .. ".. ,,20 The first of these phrases gives the
SEC "a blank check to suspend or disbar" 20 4 a person based on a
subjective definition of "character." Moreover, to the extent that
"integrity" is defined in its usual way, denoting "adherence to a code
of moral, . . . or other values" 20 5 it should coincide with the many
provisions of the CPR. There is, however, some indication that the
SEC views "integrity" for the securities bar as requiring a stricter
adherence to a moral code than that of a nonsecurities attorney.
20 6
The other phrase in rule 2(e)(1)(ii) is the frequently discussed
"unethical or improper professional conduct." A logical interpreta-
tion of "unethical" could be that it denotes a violation of the provi-
sions of the CPR. However, the SEC has interpreted rule 2(e) to
exceed the CPR's standards for conduct, and to require an attorney
to ensure his client's compliance with securities laws by actions be-
yond mere attempts to convince.20 7 Because the SEC's definition of
the term "unethical" is inconsistent with the commonly accepted
principles of the CPR, there is no way an attorney can be sure that
his conduct will not subject him to disciplinary action under rule
2(e). This situation is exacerbated in the case of "improper" con-
duct. Because both the words "unethical" and "improper" are used
in the same clause, they cannot be intended to be synonymous. Pro-
fessor Marsh opined that "improper" "should mean something more
than conduct which is viewed with displeasure by the Commission;
however, it is impossible to say what more is required. '20 8
Because rule 2(e) is ambiguous, subjective and nebulous, 20 9 it is
virtually impossible for an attorney to discern the borderline between
zealous advocacy and conduct which rule 2(e) proscribes. Surely one
203 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(l)(ii) (1981).
204 Marsh, supra note 7, at 996.
205 See WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 439 (1967).
206 Indeed, the SEC has frequently expressed its view that the unique role of securities
attorneys requires of them a higher standard of care than that required of other attorneys. See
general4' text accompanying notes 221-37 infra.
207 See discussion of In re Carter &Johnson in the text accompanying notes 60-76 supra.
208 Marsh, supra note 7, at 996-97.
209 Rule 2(e)(1)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(iii) (1981), provides for suspension or disbar-
ment of a person who has "wilfully violated" the federal securities laws. Though the SEC has
attempted to define the term so it is not vague, it has nevertheless confined attorney conduct
to a minimum of zealousness. "Willfulness" has been defined as the intentional commission
of an act, regardless of whether the act was known to be a violation of the securities laws. See
Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965). See also SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978);
Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1977).
"[I]n other words, he [who committed the act] did not do what he did while sleepwalking."
Marsh, sufia note 7, at 997.
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cannot expect to avoid hazy areas when the issues are not clearly
resolvable, but the haze should be confined to the smallest possible
area. The SEC in rule 2(e) has not striven to minimize the haze; it
has created a massive and effective smoke screen.
B. Undue Interference with the Attorney-Client Relationshzp." The Lawyer
as Advisor
The sixth amendment right to counsel should apply with full
force to situations in which the attorney is not "advocating" his cli-
ent's positionperse, but is advising his client regarding the intricacies
of the federal securities laws. Such is the definition of practice as-
serted by the SEC for purposes of commencing disciplinary proceed-
ings.2 10 Because rule 2(e) applies to any attorney engaged in practice
before it, it should follow that any impingement on the attorney's
representation of the client in any capacity recognized by the SEC as
practice violates the sixth amendment.
To fully understand the nature of the violation of the right to
counsel when the attorney is acting as an advisor, it is necessary to
examine the nature of that role. There has been considerable debate
regarding the varying duties and responsibilities of an attorney-advi-
sor and his relationship with his client, the public and the regulatory
authority. The SEC has attempted in recent years to restructure the
attorney-client relationship to further its own goals. This restructur-
ing, however, has hardly met with universal acceptance. Moreover,
it constitutes, in conjunction with the omnipresent threat of a rule
2(e) proceeding, impermissible interference with the right and duty
of an attorney to zealously represent the interests of his client.
1. The Nonlitigating Securities Attorney: Advisor, Advocate, or
Auditor?
Whether an attorney is an advocate in the courtroom and some-
thing completely different in the law office is an issue that has yet to
be resolved. Because the distinction between advocate and advisor is
a difficult one to make,211 several scholars have asserted that the dis-
tinction is irrelevant. As Monroe Freeman stated:
[Ojur legal system is basically an adversarial one and every law-
yer-whether drafting a contract, counselling in a business venture,
writing a will, or performing any other service on behalf of a cli-
210 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(g) (1981) and text accompanying note 19supra.
211 See Coleman, The Dirent Duties of Lawyers and Accountants, 30 Bus. LAw 91 (spec. issue
1975).
[October 19811
RIGHT TO COUNSEL VIOLATION
ent-acts in such a way as to protect the client from being at a
disadvantage in potential future litigation. Particularly should that
be so, in a free society, when the potential adversary is the govern-
ment itself. In that sense, and it is a crucial one, every lawyer is an
advocate, irrespective of whether he or she ever enters a
courtroom.
21 2
There are, of course, those who disagree with this point of view,
and base their concept of a bifurcated practice on the distinction be-
tween the past and future conduct of a client.213 The advocate deals
with past conduct, and is therefore presented with an existing situa-
tion. The advisor, however, is responsible for shaping the future con-
duct of his client, and should consequently be held to a higher
standard of care for the interests of third parties.21 4 This theory was
espoused by Chairman Williams in speeches during his tenure on the
SEC,215 and was reiterated by him in his concurrence in In re Keating,
Muething & Klekamp. 216
It has occasionally been asserted that the attorney-advisor
should be independent of his client, just as auditors are independent
of theirs. This proposal has met with nearly unanimous opposi-
tion,21 7 even from those who perceive the SEC as having the power to
regulate attorney conduct. 218 The attorney does not certify docu-
ments, as does an auditor;219 attorneys are not specifically named as
212 Freedman, supra note 9, at 287-88.
213 See, e.g., Gruenbaum, supra note 4, at 800-02; Sonde, supra note 4, at 862-63.
214 See Gruenbaum, sura note 4, at 800-01. See a/so ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY, EC 7-2 (1980).
215 See Speech by SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams, Corporate Accountability and the
Lawyer's Role, before the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law (Aug. 8,
1978), reprinted in 465 Sac. RaG. & L. REP. (BNA) H-I, at H-3 (1978).
216 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 15,982 (July 2, 1979) (Williams, Chair-
man, concurring), reprinted in 17 SEC DocKET 1149, 1163, 1165.
217 See Daley & Karmel, supra note 4, at 758-59; Lipman, supra note 4, at 450-52; Lowe &
Kripke, Summag, and Conclusionr, 30 Bus. LAW. 224, 224-26 (spec. issue 1975); Lorne, The Corpo-
rate and Securities Advisor, The Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 423, 463-
64 (1978).
218 See Sonde, sura note 4, at 833-34.
219 See American Fin. Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043 (1962):
Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting as the client's advisor,
defender, advocate and confidant enters into a personal relationship in which his
principal concern is with the interests and rights of his client. The requirement of
the [Securities] Act of certification by an independent accountant, on the other
hand, is intended to secure for the benefit of public investors the detached objectiv-
ity of a disinterested person. The certifying accountant must be one who is in no
way connected with the business or its management and who does not have any
relationship that might affect the independence which at times may require him to
voice public criticisms of his client's accounting practices.
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responsible for defects in a registration statement, as are auditors. 220
Moreover, the multi-faceted relationship between a client and its
lawyers makes it impracticable if not impossible to require indepen-
dence in some matters and zealous advocacy in other, even contem-
poraneous, situations.
2. Public Responsibility: Attorney as Policeman
Another concept which has been applied to the securities prac-
tice is that the lawyer has a duty to the public that overrides his
traditional obligations to his client. This concept views the securities
bar as an extension of the enforcement arm of the SEC, and therefore
even more susceptible to disciplinary action than the average attor-
ney. That the bar is the "SEC's reluctant police force" 221 was first
asserted in the famous footnote 20 to the SEC's opinion In re Emanuel
Fields.222 In Fields, the SEC stated that because it, with its "small
staff and limited resources, ' 223 could not adequately accomplish the
task of ensuring compliance with the securities laws, much reliance
upon the integrity and expertise of the private securities bar would
be necessary.2
24
The Fields footnote sparked debate over the desirability of con-
scripting attorneys into the SEC enforcement army. Several com-
mentators have identified the competing concerns. Lowenfels
recognized that conscription would tend to upgrade the quality of
disclosure documents by "engender[ing] greater care, more due dili-
gence, and more meticulous and painstaking preparation, ' 225 but
would also operate to deprive marginally successful clients of legal
services and to create an overly restrained bar.226 On balance, how-
ever, Lowenfels favored establishing an enforcement army.227 This
support was subsequently countered by Frederick Lipman. Noting
that the SEC's position requires an attorney faced with a conflict "to
Id at 1049. The SEC concluded that the concurrent roles of attorney-advisor and auditor are
incompatible. Id at 1050.
220 See Securities Act of 1933, § 11(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4)(1976); Loss, Summa , Re-
marks, 30 Bus. LAw. 163, 164 (spec. issue 1975).
221 See Lipman, supra note 3, at 437.
222 Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), repnntedin 2 SEC DoCKET 1, 4-5 n.20
(1973). See text accompanying notes 27-36 supra.
223 2 SEC DOCKET, at 5 n.20.
224 See id at 4-5 & n.20. See a/so Gadsby, The Securities Exchange Commission, 11 B.C. INDUS.
& CoM. L. REv. 833 (1970).
225 Lowenfels, supra note 4, at 435.
226 See i.
227 Id at 437-38.
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favor the faceless mass of potential securities buyers over the com-
pany which is in fact his employer,1 228 Lipman stated:
Although lawyers occasionally have aided management-perpetu-
ated fraud, by and large the securities bar has shown an outstand-
ing record in attempting to secure compliance with the securities
laws by the management of public companies. This compliance
was not obtained by lawyers policing their clients' activities by
threats of public disclosure. Rather, the confidence the client had
in the lawyer's undivided loyalty fostered an atmosphere of trust
and candor which enabled the client to be persuaded to take a
broad view of his long-term self-interest. . . . [Tihis confidential
relationship cannot survive if the SEC is successful in its efforts to
make securities lawyers an adjunct to the Commission's enforce-
ment division.2 2
9
Despite widespread support for the Lipman view of the attor-
ney-client relationship, 230 the SEC continued to assert its view of the
228 See Lipman, supra note 4, at 441.
229 Id at 469. See also Johnson, supira note 4, at 658:
A lawyer is not, and should not be, an agent of the government; he is a bulwark
between the citizen and the agency, neither attempting to devise means of fitting
his client within the questionable interstices of the law nor seeking to prostitute his
ethics for the benefit ofhis client. A lawyer serves the public by drafting documents
which adequately bring his client into full compliance with the securities laws; he
serves the public by vigorously defending his client against agency thrusts; and most
importantly, a lawyer serves the public by taking every possible ethical action to
assure that the conduct of the agency does not in any way jeopardize the liberties
which are so vital to the legal profession. He performs these functions from a posi-
tion of independence from external forces, under the mandate of a superior system
of regulation, and within a self-policing system; [of the delicate balance which sus-
tains individual liberties and the sophisticated and essential securities regulation
process.]
230 See, e.g., Cooney, "The SEC's Enforcement Theory," in Responsibilily of Lawyers Advising
Management, 30 Bus. LAw. 29, 31-32 (spec. issue 1975); Johnson, supra note 4, at 658; Johnson,
The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys in Pactice Before the SEC Dpishzinag Proceedings Under
Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 25 MERCER L. REv. 637, 667-69 (1974); Kosek,
supra note 4, at 468-69; Lowe & Kripke, Summary and Conclusions, 30 Bus. LAw. 223, 224-25
(spec. issue 1975); Freeman, supra note 7, at 12. But see Marquis, An Appraisal of Attornes'
Responsibilities Before Administrative Agencies, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 285, 285-92 (1976); Red-
lich, Lawyers, the Temple, and the Market Place, 30 Bus. LAw. 64, 68-69 (spec. issue 1975); Sonde,
supra note 4, at 847-49. See also SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979):
To accept the SEC's position would go far toward making the accountant both an
insurer of his client's honesty and an enforcement arm of the SEC. We can under-
stand why the SEC wishes to so conscript accountants. Its frequently late arrival on
the scene of fraud and violations of securities laws almost always suggests that had
it been there earlier with the accountant it would have caught the scent of wrong-
doing and, after an unrelenting hunt, bagged the game. What it cannot do, the
thought goes, the accountant can and should. The difficulty with this is that Con-
gress has not enacted the conscription bill that the SEC seeks to have us fashion and
fix as an interpretative gloss on existing securities laws.
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attorney as policeman.23 1 But there has been a move to severely cur-
tail SEC enforcement activity which can result in two discrete but
divergent effects.232 The cutback in enforcement of the federal secur-
ities laws could signal an end to the abuse of rule 2(e), thus mitigat-
ing the in terrorem effect of the rule on attorneys. However, the
reduction in enforcement personnel and activity would require
greater reliance on the securities bar by the SEC to ensure regulated
parties' compliance with the federal securities laws. A move in the
latter direction would perhaps increase the number of rule 2(e) pro-
ceedings as well as expand the type of conduct deemed to violate the
rule. Decreased rule 2(e) activity is more likely, however, in view of
the trend to deregulate American business and thereby to increase
productivity and improve general economic conditions. Conscrip-
tion of attorneys is tantamount to the placing of government agents
in the board rooms of American corporations. If one rejects the con-
cept of a bifurcated practice, and adheres to the theory that all attor-
neys are, in essence, advocates, such conscription constitutes an
unconstitutional intrusion into the attorney-client relationship.
C. Life Without Rule 2(e): Alternatives to SEC Discplinagy Actions
Rule 2(e) is not the exclusive sanction against attorneys who en-
gage in questionable conduct. Private civil actions, criminal prosecu-
tions, and state disbarment proceedings are all used to punish the
miscreant lawyer. Even supporters of rule 2(e) recognize that the
rule is supplemental in that it merely complements the self-regula-
tion of the bar.233 Former SEC Chairman Williams, for example,
opined that "the most fruitful issue for examination . . . is whether
the bar's enforced standards of competence and integrity are suffi-
cient to protect against lawyer abuse of those components of the pub-
lic interest embodied in the federal securities laws. ' ' 234 Indeed,
greater reliance will be placed on the self-regulation of the legal pro-
fession, regardless of whether such regulation is currently sufficient 235
Id at 788 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
231 See What the SEC Expectsefom Corporation Lawyers, FORTUNE, Oct. 23, 1978, at 143 (in-
terview with Stanley Sporkin).
232 See Transition Team Report, supra note 2, at K-7 to K-9; Seving Up Shadfor the SEC,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1981, at 68; Noble, S.E.C to Review Enforcement Policy, N.Y. Times, Nov.
17, 1981, at D28, col. 3.
233 See, e.g., Sonde, Professional Diciplinay Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAW. 157 (spec. issue 1975);
Williams, Professionalism and the Corporate Bar, 36 Bus. LAw. 159, 164 (1980).
234 Williams, Professionalism and the Corporate Bar, 36 Bus. LAw. 159, 164 (1980).
235 See, e.g.,Johnson, supra note 4, at 651-53; Texas Tech Comment, supra note 4, at 107-
08.
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or not 23 6 to deter and punish the unscrupulous.
Nevertheless, state bar associations are naturally better
equipped to cope with disciplinary problems. State disciplinary pro-
ceedings, which operate under the relative specificity of the CPR, are
inherently more fair than rule 2(e) proceedings. Moreover, the state
bar standards themselves, because they are tangible, are more likely
to promote a suitable mix of zealous advocacy and ethical conduct
within the profession. State bar associations have more experience
with disciplinary proceedings than does the SEC, and as such are
more likely to adjudicate the rights of the attorney in accord with
commonly accepted standards of professional conduct.
237
V. Conclusion
During the past decade, attorneys have been confronted with an
extraordinary increase in the SEC's use of rule 2(e) disciplinary pro-
ceedings. This constitutes a deprivation of constitutionally required
counsel for the SEC-regulated client. Even though the sixth amend-
ment is facially applicable only to criminal prosecutions, a theory has
developed which extends the amendment's safeguards to proceedings
brought under punitive statutes. An examination of the legislative
history of the federal securities laws exposes the punitive intent of
Congress in enacting those statutes. Accordingly, the sixth amend-
ment guarantees should apply to proceedings before the SEC.
Rule 2(e) impermissibly interferes with the proper functioning
of the attorney-client relationship, in that it is an intimidating force
which serves to severely attenuate advocacy. The potential for mis-
use of the rule exists because the SEC acts as prosecutor, investigator,
adjudicator, and disciplinarian. Moreover, the vagueness of the stan-
dards of rule 2(e) makes it nearly impossible for an attorney engaged
in an ongoing practice to determine whether specific past or prospec-
tive conduct will subsequently be deemed violative of the rule. The
SEC through its releases and decisions has done much to perpetuate
the vagueness of rule 2(e) standards.
236 See, e.g., Kosek, Professional Responsibility of Accountants and Lawyers Before the Securties and
Exchange Commission, 72 L. LIB. J. 453, 468-69 (1979); Comment, SECDis plinaqi Rules and the
Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DuKE LJ.
969, 975. See also Winter, Dliscpline: Lawyer Discipline Probed in the States, 66 A.B.AJ. 1193
(1980).
237 It bears emphasis that the commission does not regard itself as a disciplinary authority
for attorneys in the sense that state bar disciplinary officials so regard themselves, nor does the
Commission have any program as such for policing the ethics of the bar generally or even of
the attorneys who practice before it. Gonson, supra note 23, at 1.
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The role of an attorney cannot logically be divided into those of
advocate and advisor, especially in the context of the securities prac-
tice. The SEC, moreover, seeks to assert rule 2(e) in situations other
than those in which the attorney is actually appearing before or at an
administrative proceeding. The drafting or preparing of documents
for filing with the SEC, or the giving of advice to clients regarding
the federal securities laws, are considered practice before the SEC.
Improper conduct, as determined pursuant to the subjective stan-
dards of the agency, may result in the suspension or disbarment of
the attorney from practicing before the SEC. Consequently, rule 2(e)
not only violates the sixth amendment when attorneys actually ap-
pear before the SEC, but has a chilling effect upon the entire securi-
ties practice.
Rule 2(e) cannot and should not be saved. It is an unwelcome
anachronism in an era of increasing self-regulation of industry and
decreasing governmental involvement in the economy. Only if attor-
neys are permitted to represent their clients zealously within the
bounds of the law can the adversary method for the determination of
legal rights and remedies be preserved.
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